IEEE Spectrum publishes a critical analysis of age verification systems, framing them as problematic ('traps') that pit child protection against privacy rights. The article directly engages Articles 12 (privacy), 19 (free expression), and 22 (social welfare), examining how platform age verification regimes create regulatory dilemmas affecting adolescent users. The structural privacy posture—including default consent denying ad/analytics storage and data redaction—aligns with the article's editorial focus on privacy protection.
>Some observers present privacy-preserving age proofs involving a third party, such as the government, as a solution, but they inherit the same structural flaw: many users who are legally old enough to use a platform do not have government ID.
Most of this debate makes more sense if the actual goal is liability reduction, not child safety. If it were genuinely about protecting kids, you'd regulate infinite scroll and algorithmic engagement optimization, not who can log in.
Age verification is very hard, because parents will give their children their unlocked account, and children will steal their parents' unlocked account. If that's criminalized (like alcohol), it will happen too often to prosecute (much more frequently than alcohol, which is rarely prosecuted anyways). I don't see a solution that isn't a fundamental culture shift.
If there's a fundamental culture shift, there's an easy way to prevent children from using the internet:
- Don't give them an unlocked device until they're adults
- "Locked" devices and accounts have a whitelist of data and websites verified by some organization to be age-appropriate (this may include sites that allow uploads and even subdomains, as long as they're checked on upload)
The only legal change necessary is to prevent selling unlocked devices without ID. Parents would take their devices from children and form locked software and whitelisting organizations.
There are alternatives to ID verification if the goal is protecting children.
You could, for example, make it illegal to target children with targeted advertising campaigns and addictive content. Then throw the executives who authorized such programs in jail. Punish the people causing the harm.
Big tech likes this because there are a lot more face recognition technologies in the wild in real life and being able to connect all real life data to online data is quite valuable. It's also quite possibly the largest training set ever for face recognition if ids are stored and given how ids and images are sold across many companies it seems very high probability that some company will retain the data rather than delete after use.
Why is no one talking about using zero knowledge proofs for solving this? Instead of every platform verifying all its users itself (and storing PII on its own servers), a small number of providers could expose an API which provides proof of verification. I'm not sure if some kind of machine vision algorithm could be used in combination with zero-knowledge technology to prevent even that party from storing original documents, but I don't see why not. The companies implementing these measures really seem to be just phoning it in from a privacy perspective.
> And the only way to prove that you checked is to keep the data indefinitely.
This is a false premise already; the company can check the age (or have a third party like iDIN [0] do it), then set a marker "this person is 18+" and "we verified it using this method at this date". That should be enough.
If we're going to do this at all, it should be on the device, not the website/app. Parents flag their child's device or browser as under 18, and websites/apps follow suit. Parents get the control they're looking for, while service providers don't have to verify or store IDs. I guess it's just more difficult to pressure big dogs like google/apple/mozilla for this than pornhub and discord.
Give our personal devices have the ability to verify our age and identity securely and store on device like they do our fingerprint or face data.
Services that need access only verify it cryptographically. So my iPhone can confirm I’m over 21 for my DoorDash app in the same way it stores my biometric data.
The challenge here is the adoption of these encryption services and whether companies can rely on devices for that for compliance without having to cut off service for those without it set up.
We'll try everything, it seems, other than holding parents accountable for what their children consume.
In the United States, you can get in trouble if you recklessly leave around or provide alcohol/guns/cigarettes for a minor to start using, yet somehow, the same social responsibility seems thrown out the window for parents and the web.
Yes, children are clever - I was one once. If you want to actually protect children and not create the surveillance state nightmare scenario we all know is going to happen (using protecting children as the guise, which is ironic, because often these systems are completely ineffective at doing so anyway) - then give parents strong monitoring and restriction tools and empower them to protect their children. They are in a much better and informed position to do so than a creepy surveillance nanny state.
That is, after all, the primary responsibility of a parent to begin with.
I have no idea where this idea that Internet is toxic to children is coming from. Is that some type of moral panic? Weren't most of you guys children/adolescents during the 2000's?
Even if you design the perfect system, kids will just ask parents for an unlocked account, many parents will accept, myself included. My kids have full access to the internet and I never used parental control, I talk to them. Of course, I don't want to give parenting advice, that would be presumptuous. But, my point is that a motivated kid will find a way, you have to "work" on that motivation.
Many of the worst present on the internet is not age gated at all, you have millions of porn websites without even a "are you over 18" popup. There are plethora of toxic forums...
Of course it's a complex problem, but the current approach sacrifice a lot of what made the internet possible and I don't like it.
I would like to take the discussion in the other direction. How about we offer safe spaces instead of banning the unsafe spaces for kids.
Similar to how there is specific channels for children on the TV. Perhaps the government can even incentivize such channels. It would also make it easier for parents to monitor and set boundaries. Parents would only need to monitor if the tv is still tuned to disney channel or similar instead of some adult channels.
Similarly this kind of method could be applied to online spaces. Ofcourse there will be some kids that will find ways around it but they will most likely be outliers.
I work at a European identity wallet system that uses a zero knowledge proof age identification system. It derives an age attribute such as "over 18" from a passport or ID, without disclosing any other information such as the date of birth. As long as you trust the government that gave out the ID, you can trust the attribute, and anonymously verify somebodies age.
I think there are many pros and cons to be said about age verification, but I think this method solves most problems this article supposes, if it is combined with other common practices in the EU such as deleting inactive accounts and such. These limitations are real, but tractable. IDs can be issued to younger teenagers, wallet infrastructure matures over time, and countries without strong identity systems primarily undermine their own age bans. Jurisdictions that accept facial estimation as sufficient verification are not taking enforcement seriously in the first place. The trap described in this article is a product of the current paradigm, not an inevitability.
Parents are competing with multi-trillion dollar companies who have invested untold amounts of cash and resources into making their content addictive. When parents try to help their children, it's an uphill battle -- every platform that has kids on it also tends to have porn, or violence, or other things, as these platform generally have disappointingly ineffective moderation. Most parents turn to age verification because it's the only way they can think of to compete with the likes of Meta or ByteDance, but the issue is that these platforms shouldn't have this content to begin with. Platforms should be smaller -- the same site shouldn't be serving both pornography and my school district's announcement page and my friend's travel pictures. Large platforms are turning their unwillingness to moderate into legal and privacy issues, when in fact it should simply be a matter of "These platforms have adult content, and these ones don't". Then, parents can much more easily ban specific platforms and topics. Right now there's no levers to pull or adjust, and parent s have their hands tied. You can't take kids of Instagram or TikTok -- they will lose their friends. I hate the fact that the "keep up with my extended family" platform is the same as the "brainrot and addiction" one. The platforms need to be small enough that parents actually have choices on what to let in and what not to. Until either platforms are broken up via. antitrust or until the burden of moderation is on the company, we're going to keep getting privacy-infringing solutions.
If you support privacy, you should support antitrust, else we're going to be seeing these same bills again and again and again until parents can effectively protect their children.
Undermining data protection and privacy is clearly the point. The fact that it's happening everywhere at the same time makes it look to me like a bunch of leaders got together and decided that online anonymity is a problem.
It's not like kids having access to adult content is a new problem after all. Every western government just decided that we should do something about it at roughly the same time after decades of indifference.
The "age verification" story is casus belli. This is about ID, political dissent, and fears of people being exposed to the wrong brand of propaganda.
I worked for a decade in what I would consider the highest level of our kids' privacy ever designed, at PBS KIDS. This was coming off a startup that attempted to do the same for grownups, but failed because of dirty money.
Every security attempt becomes a facade or veil in time, unless it's nothing. Capture nothing, keep nothing, say nothing. Kids are smart AF and will outlearn you faster than you can think. Don't even try to capture PII ever. Watch the waves and follow their flow, make things for them to learn from but be extremely careful how you let the grownups in, and do it in pairs, never alone.
Looking at actual data regarding Australia's landmark legislation setting a minimum age of 16 for social media access with enforcement starting on December 10, 2025 indicates weakened data protection. The Australian data suggests that while the legislation has successfully cleared the decks of millions of underage accounts (4.7 million account deactivations together with increased VPN usage and "ghost" accounts to bypass restrictions), it has simultaneously forced platforms to rely on third-party identity vendors, with the following failures so far:
1) Persona (Identity Vendor) Exposure (Feb 20, 2026): researchers discovered an exposed frontend belonging to Persona, an identity verification vendor used by platforms like Discord. This system was performing over 260 distinct checks, including facial recognition and "adverse media" screening, raising massive concerns about the scope creep of age verification.
2) Victorian Department of Education (Jan 2026): a breach impacting all 1,700 government schools exposed student names and encrypted passwords. This is a primary example of how child-related data remains a high-value target.
3) Prosura Data Breach (Jan 4, 2026): this financial services firm suffered a breach of 300,000 customer records.
4) University of Sydney (Dec 2025): a code library breach affected 27,000 people right as the new legislation was rolling out.
When I was a kid, my parents installed Net Nanny on our home computer. I installed a keylogger. No more Net Nanny; lots more EverQuest.
I don't like age verification in general, for anything. The age gates in our society are very subjective.
Many times my Dad would buy alcohol at the grocery store w/ me (underage) in tow, but they never asked for my ID or refused to sell to him. Now, when I go buy alcohol as an adult with my wife (we are both in our mid-late 30s) they ask to see her ID as well as mine? If she leaves her ID at home then she has to wait in the car because they will refuse the sale if she comes into the store and cannot prove her age.
Buying a case of beer with a group of 8 year olds? No problem. Bottle of wine for you and your wife? Let me get both IDs.
What problem? I don't think internet websites and apps actually need to know the face, age, or name of their users if their users don't want to provide that information. With exceptions for things like gambling websites.
The problem is not that we aren’t doing age verification, it’s that a group of authoritarians are trying to force mandatory implementation of age verification (and concomitant removal of anonymity). That’s the problem.
I'm not convinced age restrictions like this are a good idea. But yeah, the non-availability of IDs in the US is a self-inflicted problem.
Another example where this plays a role are voter registration and ID requirements for voting in the US. It is entirely bizarre to me how these discussions just accept it as a law of nature that it's expensive and a lot of effort to get an ID. This is something that could be changed.
Completely agree. The internet works differently than how people want it to, and filtering services are notoriously easy to bypass. Even if these age-verification laws passed with resounding scope and support, what would stop anyone from merely hosting porn in Romania or some country that didn't care about US age-verification laws. The leads to run down would be legion. I think you could seriously degrade the porn industry (which I wouldn't necessarily mind) but it would be more or less impossible to prevent unauthorized internet users from accessing pornography. And of course that's the say nothing of the blast radius that would come with age-verification becoming entrenched on the internet.
China (and US via latin american countries and it's own poor people ...via benefit programs access via id.gov) is testing both biometrics and device id to evaluate pros and cons, and to merge data, when it come to autocratic control.
In china there are places to scan you device and get coupons. usually at elevators in residential buildings so they can track also if you're arriving or leaving easily.
In the US every store tracks and report to ad networks your Bluetooth ids. and we know what happens to ad networks.
US now requires cars to report data, which was optional before (e.g. onstar) and china joined on this since the ev boom.
I think it's because there's always a group of nosy busybodies finger-wagging about protecting the children and we have to do decorative theatrics to satiate whatever narratives they've convinced themselves of
People are talking about it, at least here anyway.
The reason you don’t see it in policy discussion from the officials pushing these laws is because removal of anonymity is the point. It’s nit about protecting kids, it never was. It’s about surveillance and a chilling effect on speech.
If targeting children with advertising got corporate execs thrown in jail, wouldn't the companies just roll out age verification for users like they do now? How would this rule change their behavior? They have to know who the children are to not target them.
Stronger punishment creates more of an incentive to age verify. Which is basically why it's happening now.
So don't use big tech. No one needs discord, or porn, or social media. But this is not the answer. The answer is fighting to change the laws. And we can start changing the laws by boycotting big tech. Laws are changed by money flows, not ideology.
It's my job as a parent (and I have several kids...) to monitor the things they consume and talk with them about it.
I don't want some blanket ban on content unless it's "age appropriate", because I don't approve that content being banned. (honestly - the idea of "age appropriate" is insulting in the first place)
Fuck man, I can even legally give my kids alcohol - I don't see why it's appropriate to enforce what content I allow them to see.
And I have absolutely all of the same tools you just discussed today. I can lock devices down just fine.
Age verification is a scam to increase corporate/governmental control. Period.
The solution has always been there: Assume everybody is an adult.
The only reasonable way to deal with children on the Internet is to treat Internet access like access to alcohol/drugs. There is no need for children to access the Internet full stop.
Internet is a network in which everything can connect to everything, and every connected machine can run clients, servers, p2p nodes and what not. Controlling every possible endpoint your child might connect to is not feasible. Shutting the entire network down because "won't somebody please think of the children" is not acceptable.
And, don't let them trick you. This is the endgoal. An unprecedented level of control over the flow of information.
Interestingly, regulating these would be good for adults as well. A lot of these very large online companies enjoy an asymmetric power advantage. We should aim to protect ourselves against them, in addition to our children.
I think this is what my German electronic ID card does. The card connects to an app on my phone via NFC, a service can cryptographically verify a claim about my age, and no additional info is leaked to the service provider or the government.
Nope, as the article notes, it is actually almost never enough because it does not stand up to legal scrutiny. And for good reason: there's no way to conclusively prove that the platform actually verified the user's age, as opposed to simply saying they did, before letting them in.
> Age verification is very hard, because parents will give their children their unlocked account, and children will steal their parents' unlocked account
More simply: If ID checks are fully anonymous (as many here propose when the topic comes up) then every kid will just have their friends’ older sibling ID verify their account one afternoon. Or they’ll steal their parents’ ID when they’re not looking.
Discussions about kids and technology on HN are very weird to me these days because so many commenters have seemingly forgotten what it’s like to be a kid with technology. Before this current wave of ID check discussions it was common to proudly share stories of evading content controls or restrictions as a kid. Yet once the ID check topic comes up we’re supposed to imagine kids will just give up and go with the law? Yeah right.
I'm happy they don't because they don't know what they're doing. Hopefully countries prioritizing public health will implement a social media ban for the vulnerable population which gives them some time to grow up without all that garbage poisoning their brains. Then when they're 16 or whatever age, hopefully by that age we'll have realized that this is actually like cigarettes and everyone, all age groups treat it like that.
Better than muddying the waters trying to make it less addictive but then letting them on there when their brains aren't ready.
The real problem with this is that the ultimate objective isn't age verification, it's complete de-anonymization. I think different groups want this for different reasons, but the simple reality is that minimizing the identify information transferred around is antithetical to their goals.
I am a bit confused by that comment. Are parents social responsible to prevent companies from selling alcohol/guns/cigarettes to minors? If a company set up shop in a school and sold those things to minors during school breaks, who has the social responsibility to stop that?
Just a personal anecdote from my life - I have set up Youtube account for my kid with correct age restrictions (he is 11). Also this account is under family plan so there are no ads.
My kid logs out of this account so he can watch restricted content. I wonder - what is PG rating for logged out experience?
A monitoring solution might have worked for my case if my parents had monitored my Internet history, if they always made sure to check in on what I thought/felt from what I watched and made sure I felt secure in relying on them to back me up in the worst cases.
But I didn't have emotionally mature parents, and I'm sure so many children growing up now don't either. They're going to read arguments like these and say they're already doing enough. Maybe they truly believe they are, even if they're mistaken. Or maybe they won't read arguments like these at all. Parenting methods are diverse but smartphones are ubiquitous.
So yes, I agree that parents need to be held accountable, but I'm torn on if the legal avenue is feasible compared to the cultural one. Children also need more social support if they can't rely on their parents like in my case, or tech is going to eat them alive. Social solutions/public works are kind of boring compared to technology solutions, but society has been around longer than smartphones.
Technologists engage in an understandable, but ultimately harmful behavior: when they don't want outcome X, they deny that the technology T(X) works. Consider key escrow, DRM, and durable watermarking alongside age verification. They've all been called cryptographically impossible, but they're not. It's just socially obligatory to pretend they can't be done. And what happens when you create an environment in which the best are under a social taboo against working on certain technologies? Do you think that these technologies stop existing?
LOL.
Of course these technologies keep existing, and you end up with the worst, most wretched people implementing them, and we're all worse off. Concretely, few people are working on ZKPs for age verification because the hive mind of "good people" who know what ZKPs are make working on age verification social anathema.
Most people have only a light grasp of what infinite scroll and algorithmic engagement optimization means. They know they like the scrolling apps more, but it takes a bit of research and education to really understand the specific mechanics and alternatives. We get this well as tech literate but many people using these apps today, are neither tech literate, nor even remember a world before infinite scrolling media was a thing. It seems incredibly obvious mechanism but I've explained it to people, and it takes a few times for it to really sink in and become a specific mental model for how they see the world.
Article explicitly exercises freedom of expression by publishing substantive critical analysis of age verification policies. Author Waydell D. Carvalho is identified as 'independent researcher' with explicit expertise in 'AI governance, regulatory design, and socio-technical risk.' Article examines platform regulation and advocates scrutiny of age verification effectiveness. Headline frames policy as problematic ('trap'), exerting critical editorial voice. Published by IEEE Spectrum, technical journalism outlet with implicit press freedom role.
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false dilemma
Description frames choice as binary: 'enforce age restrictions or protect user privacy,' implying these are mutually exclusive without exploring middle-ground solutions.
build 1ad9551+j7zs · deployed 2026-03-02 09:09 UTC · evaluated 2026-03-02 11:31:12 UTC
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