+0.58 US border forces are seizing Americans' phone data and storing it for 15 years (www.engadget.com S:-0.01 )
810 points by jaarse 1262 days ago | 545 comments on HN | Moderate positive Contested Editorial · v3.7 · 2026-02-28 12:24:09 0
Summary Privacy & Surveillance Advocates
Engadget reports on US border authorities' practice of seizing travelers' device data without warrants and retaining it for 15 years in a database accessible to thousands of government officers. The article, citing Senator Ron Wyden's advocacy, criticizes warrantless searches, indefinite data retention, and lack of oversight as violations of privacy and due process rights. The reporting demonstrates strong editorial advocacy for privacy protection and government accountability, though the domain's own surveillance-based ad tracking creates structural tension with this advocacy.
Article Heatmap
Preamble: +0.39 — Preamble P Article 1: +0.33 — Freedom, Equality, Brotherhood 1 Article 2: ND — Non-Discrimination Article 2: No Data — Non-Discrimination 2 Article 3: +0.45 — Life, Liberty, Security 3 Article 4: ND — No Slavery Article 4: No Data — No Slavery 4 Article 5: +0.15 — No Torture 5 Article 6: ND — Legal Personhood Article 6: No Data — Legal Personhood 6 Article 7: +0.27 — Equality Before Law 7 Article 8: +0.30 — Right to Remedy 8 Article 9: +0.39 — No Arbitrary Detention 9 Article 10: ND — Fair Hearing Article 10: No Data — Fair Hearing 10 Article 11: +0.45 — Presumption of Innocence 11 Article 12: +0.47 — Privacy 12 Article 13: ND — Freedom of Movement Article 13: No Data — Freedom of Movement 13 Article 14: ND — Asylum Article 14: No Data — Asylum 14 Article 15: ND — Nationality Article 15: No Data — Nationality 15 Article 16: ND — Marriage & Family Article 16: No Data — Marriage & Family 16 Article 17: +0.34 — Property 17 Article 18: +0.24 — Freedom of Thought 18 Article 19: +0.30 — Freedom of Expression 19 Article 20: ND — Assembly & Association Article 20: No Data — Assembly & Association 20 Article 21: ND — Political Participation Article 21: No Data — Political Participation 21 Article 22: ND — Social Security Article 22: No Data — Social Security 22 Article 23: ND — Work & Equal Pay Article 23: No Data — Work & Equal Pay 23 Article 24: ND — Rest & Leisure Article 24: No Data — Rest & Leisure 24 Article 25: ND — Standard of Living Article 25: No Data — Standard of Living 25 Article 26: ND — Education Article 26: No Data — Education 26 Article 27: ND — Cultural Participation Article 27: No Data — Cultural Participation 27 Article 28: +0.36 — Social & International Order 28 Article 29: +0.33 — Duties to Community 29 Article 30: ND — No Destruction of Rights Article 30: No Data — No Destruction of Rights 30
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Editorial Mean +0.58 Structural Mean -0.01
Weighted Mean +0.36 Unweighted Mean +0.34
Max +0.47 Article 12 Min +0.15 Article 5
Signal 14 No Data 17
Volatility 0.09 (Low)
Negative 0 Channels E: 0.6 S: 0.4
SETL +0.58 Editorial-dominant
FW Ratio 57% 20 facts · 15 inferences
Evidence 30% coverage
4H 8M 2L 17 ND
Theme Radar
Foundation Security Legal Privacy & Movement Personal Expression Economic & Social Cultural Order & Duties Foundation: 0.36 (2 articles) Security: 0.30 (2 articles) Legal: 0.35 (4 articles) Privacy & Movement: 0.47 (1 articles) Personal: 0.29 (2 articles) Expression: 0.30 (1 articles) Economic & Social: 0.00 (0 articles) Cultural: 0.00 (0 articles) Order & Duties: 0.34 (2 articles)
HN Discussion 20 top-level · 30 replies
vageli 2022-09-16 12:55 UTC link
I'm not sure I missed something, the title says "Americans" but I couldn't find an elaboration on exactly _who_ is subject to these searches. The ACLU [0] seems to contend that, at least, US citizens are not subject to these measures.

[0]: https://www.aclu.org/know-your-rights/what-do-when-encounter...

iamdamian 2022-09-16 13:27 UTC link
Is there any significant effort in progress to combat this practice? I see that EFF has some old articles on the topic but I don't see anything current.
cr555 2022-09-16 13:37 UTC link
"That's when they can plug in the traveler's phone, tablet or PC to a device that copies their information, ...". would really like to know which "devices" they are talking about. fkn hard to do a full android backup these days.. this world. im tellin ya.

on another note: lets talk about how one would go about keeping ones privacy intact aka having a party in the capitol.

1. will they be able to get into my cryptrooted pinephone / hdd in those 5 days? 2. if not will this only make them more angry and privacy penetrating?

O__________O 2022-09-16 13:41 UTC link
Seems like real solution are phones that by default provided end-to-end-encryption for cloud backups, no local data “travel modes”, secure wipes, multiple logins, etc. — since trying to get countries to uniformly play by same rules seem highly unlikely.
pdimitar 2022-09-16 13:43 UTC link
Honestly, as a non-American this scares me. I am absolutely not at all important and a fairly mediocre programmer as well, I don't store compromising data about anyone, never stole code or company data in my life (and never will), etc., you get it. A normal law-abiding citizen.

I still don't want to get my phone taken on an US airport and returned an hour later with God knows how many viruses that even Apple wouldn't be able to detect on my iPhone.

It's not about having something to hide. It's about not liking it when people poke their noses in your business without you being a criminal. And no I don't think installing backdoors on each device "to catch the criminals more easily" is a solution at all.

howmayiannoyyou 2022-09-16 13:49 UTC link
Terrifying for only 2 reasons:

1. Any malicious person savvy enough to pull off a crime of interest to the Feds is smart enough to provide a wiped or burner phone to DHS/ICE, and they have to know this. So, what is the point in doing this if not to target law abiding citizens.

2. USGOV has a spotty track record of keeping this information secure. A foreign actor is likely to access this info eventually. As one former government official once joked many years ago - concerning Chinese hacking - "Well, its probably more secure in the CCP's data center, so I wouldn't worry."

This is the problem when a non-technical generation makes the rules and regs. Luddites ought not be permitted to ascend the GS ranks.

jliptzin 2022-09-16 13:51 UTC link
This happened to me in 2016 crossing into Canada. Borders agents took my phone for no reason, demand I give them the password to unlock it (otherwise they would seize the phone), took it in the back for 45 min before returning it and letting me enter. I think it’s obvious they took all my data.

So now when I travel I just bring my “travel” phone with no sensitive data on it.

algoatecorn 2022-09-16 14:58 UTC link
As a thought experiment, what would happen if you wrote your own malicious payload to a burner device and handed that over? What if you warned the border agents that your device would deliver malicious code and they plugged it in anyway?
browningstreet 2022-09-16 15:46 UTC link
On my last trip back from Europe in June, when I re-entered the US, US Customs & Border Control didn't ask for my passport. No one did. They did wave a webcam connected to a computer in front of my face, and then a moment later, called out my name and said I could enter. Same with everyone coming through the international border area.

I think that's just as weird a development and worthy of "WTH?" as this topic.

caseysoftware 2022-09-16 15:51 UTC link
Read the book "Habeas Data"

It's a great overview of digital privacy and protection laws in the US, how they came about, and what protections they actually offer. The short answer is "very few" and the long answer is "never ever ever turn over your data short of a court order and even then try to fight it."

Then with Third Party Doctrine, most of the few/limited privacy/warrant rules go out the window.

Also, I'm not a lawyer.

macrolime 2022-09-16 16:05 UTC link
Even if you are a person who will never in your life end up as any kind of person of interest for the government, handing over data in this way could still be quite dangerous.

Phones will often contain data that can facilitate theft and fraud if ending up in the wrong hands. If they're able to copy everything, including private data from all apps that could be quite bad. For example many countries now use apps to login to online banking, with private keys for the login stored in the app. Will that be copied? Will it ever be found out if one of the 3000 government officials with access to this data sold it on darknet markets?

Maybe some months after your travel you suddenly wake up one day to find all your money transferred from your bank account to some account in Nigeria.

kornork 2022-09-16 16:07 UTC link
I wish the 2nd Amendment folks would care about the 4th Amendment just as much.
tarunupaday 2022-09-16 16:13 UTC link
This (and similar issues) is the main reason that I donate a non-trivial (10%) part of my earnings to ACLU (and 2 other) organization.

Our rights and freedoms do not come without struggle. And they sure do not last without somebody constantly defending them. And it’s only bravado to assume that we can stand against the might of federal agents as individuals without dedicated organizations fighting for us.

Please donate to ACLU - as much as you can.

zitterbewegung 2022-09-16 16:17 UTC link
One thing I learned at Defcon 30 was how to break encryption at rest by just storing the encrypted data and wait for a quantum computer to be developed but storing it for 15 years wouldn’t be long enough (average guess of scientists were 50 years in the future).

It makes the NSAs Utah data center to have other applications like parallel reconstruction.

MrDresden 2022-09-16 16:44 UTC link
As a European I find it strange how the article and many comments here seem to focus only on it being US citizen's data being hovered up by the boarder control.

No one's private data should be taken without a legitimate cause, no matter their nationality.

arkadiyt 2022-09-16 16:51 UTC link
Reminder for the folks using iPhones, you can prevent law enforcement from doing this by "pair locking" your device: https://arkadiyt.com/2019/10/07/pair-locking-your-iphone-wit...
lizardactivist 2022-09-16 18:41 UTC link
Imagine having a knock on your door because you exchanged a few friendly text messages 15 years ago with someone who is being investigated for a crime committed today.

Citizens are suspects. Tourists are terrorists. Everyone is a potential criminal in the land of the free.

kelnos 2022-09-16 20:45 UTC link
I submitted this the other day but it didn't get any traction: the Protecting Data at the Border Act[0] is a thing, but has barely been touched by the relevant Senate committee since it was introduced nearly a year ago. As expected, it's not perfect: it has some carve-outs, and only applies to US citizens (and maybe permanent residents; I forget the exact definition of "U.S. person"). But it would definitely improve things. Maybe something to bug your Senators about.

https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/295...

throwaway12557 2022-09-16 21:39 UTC link
This recently happened to me earlier this year. I am a U.S. citizen, coming back to the states from South America. I have not broken any laws nor do I intend to.

I put up a fuss and almost missed my flight, but they took both my laptop and cellphone into a back room with about 5-8 other people on my flight. Made me unlock of course.

Here is the pamphlet they let me take… saved and documented. They take down hardware addresses and more, and would not allow lawyers on the scene or for me to witness their search. Here are all the pages of the pamphlet:

https://imgur.com/a/qNovC83

As a tech worker and privacy advocate for all I was rightfully not thrilled. I still need to buy new hardware, I had no idea this was the case as far as data storage and 15 years but figured they probably upload malware and all that fun stuff. Neat. I have been a citizen my whole life.

Reading through the comments now, I am glad I learned a little. If they pull the stunt again I will happily deny and wait however long and just rebook a flight and maybe hire a lawyer. It’s a gross abuse of power.

BXLE_1-1-BitIs1 2022-09-16 23:55 UTC link
US CBP and other national border agencies change target priorities from time to time, which is reflected in the questions they ask you.

I recently had a long discussion with CBP about my Canadian passport showing a US birthplace. Under a repealed section of the INA my US nationality lapsed some half a century ago and I suspect a call was made to the Port Manager. Since then my entries have not discussed this point which leads me to suspect their system has been updated.

The current question is your plate number (already displayed by the camera). You need written permission from the vehicle owner to cross the border, even if the owner is family.

Border officers may also have quotas for more thorough examinations.

I remember a lawyer on radio saying that they take "naked" laptops across the border.

Most definitely DO NOT cross ANY border with anything that in the most remote possibility would trigger the interest of customs.

To sanitise a phone or tablet, fill it with dashcam video, encrypt and factory reset. Then set it up with a fresh Google or Apple ID.

Maybe leave your sim card at home.

Having repartitioned a tablet, I discovered that there is a massive amount of hardware data in partitions that most people are totally unaware of.

jaarse 2022-09-16 13:04 UTC link
From reading the directive it appears as though they don’t have an exemption for Americans: https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/PIA-CBP...

Of course the official response is what you would expect:

“CBP officials declined, however, to answer questions about how many Americans’ phone records are in the database, how many searches have been run or how long the practice has gone on, saying it has made no additional statistics available “due to law enforcement sensitivities and national security implications.””

ep103 2022-09-16 13:15 UTC link
I mean, that's great and all, but IIRC this Supreme Court has been instituting a policy of Absolute Immunity related to immigration issues via Egbert v. Boule. If one has absolute immunity, the law simply isn't a concern for federal border security.
throwoutway 2022-09-16 13:21 UTC link
The ACLU is wrong. The border does it all the time. Here is the one that sticks out in my mind as the most popular case:

https://gizmodo.com/border-agent-demands-nasa-scientist-unlo...

Frost1x 2022-09-16 13:39 UTC link
From what I understand, the border is a sort of wild west in terms of citizens rights and lack there of. As usual with those seeking power and greed, boundary conditions that are not clearly defined are optimized around for their goals. Where do your rights begin and end as a US citizen? That's ignoring all the giant carve aways in your rights when it comes to reentry.

Much of it's quite silly in the era of technology and current society scales anyways where most the nonsense they could be concerned about being on your personal phone in terms of data can be conducted right inside the border without ever leaving. So the excuses for cloning phones and archiving data outside of another loophole that let's them spy on US citizens are pretty limited. Anything on your phone they could be concerned about can be archived, encrypted, and tucked away somewhere on the internet that's far less tracable. So what information do you really need? Outside of the really stupid criminals (who will eventually learn to be more sophisticated and evade these approaches), what do you expect to catch?

Preventing this practice should be a no brainer.

Tijdreiziger 2022-09-16 13:44 UTC link
I'm guessing they're talking about Cellebrite gear: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cellebrite_UFED
Bakary 2022-09-16 13:48 UTC link
Or just a burner with plausible activity stored on it to give the impression that it's your main phone.
Tijdreiziger 2022-09-16 13:50 UTC link
Also, I'm sure the US isn't the only country that does this. So if you travel internationally at all, you're essentially boned when it comes to personal privacy.
oneplane 2022-09-16 13:51 UTC link
They will get a $5 wrench and beat you until you give it up yourself, per XKCD https://xkcd.com/538/

In other words: this isn't a technical challenge, either you comply and give them your private stuff, or you're not going anywhere. Maybe you can con them into giving a 'public' part of the phone and pretending that's all there is, but again, that's social engineering and not a technical challenge.

laweijfmvo 2022-09-16 13:53 UTC link
Also relevant/interesting is this "exception" the US government claims to the Constitution: https://www.aclu.org/know-your-rights/border-zone

I've heard of "border" being applied to anywhere 100 miles from an _airport_, but can't find the reference, which would cover like 99% of the country.

Bakary 2022-09-16 13:59 UTC link
The elephant in the room in this case is that at a most basic level a State is an entity that maintains a (near) monopoly of violence in a given area. Being a normal law-abiding citizen just means that you are currently functioning in an area where the State's goals somewhat coincide with you living with some degree of freedom and comfort. Or at least they have no current incentive to mess with your life. But the whole system of laws we see as normal is just an abstraction that masks the balance of power which is in itself not that different from gang warfare at a higher scale.

When you are disturbed by having your phone searched, what is happening is that the balance has shifted a bit against your favor, and you subconsciously realize that your position is not as safe as it once was. But it was never truly safe, just stable in a certain point and time. The fact that you are not a criminal is irrelevant, because respecting or not respecting the law is very relative. The mental separation between the criminal and the law-abider is fictional in that both are just on a spectrum of usefulness and loyalty to the State.

pearjuice 2022-09-16 13:59 UTC link
45 minutes of unsupervised access to your phone? Even if it's a "travel" phone I wouldn't connect it to any other device after that.
dylan604 2022-09-16 14:00 UTC link
>Any malicious person savvy enough to pull off a crime of interest...and they have to know this.

You'd be amazed at how many dumb things smart criminals/people can do. Maintaining proper OpSec is hard. It only takes one mistake to give the LEOs a string to pull to unravel the whole sweater.

Everything else, I tend to feel the same way as you. Just wanted to mention the OpSec part

dhruval 2022-09-16 14:04 UTC link
I just just reading this Bloomberg story about a Chinese spy who was busted. It’s mind boggling how sloppy even state backed malicious agents are at information security.

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2022-09-16/chines...

booleandilemma 2022-09-16 14:05 UTC link
It's not about security, it's just another method for the government to use to make you feel like their bitch.

Now take off your shoes and walk through the scanner.

vlod 2022-09-16 14:06 UTC link
This is a good opportunity to test your backup/restore from the cloud functionality.
BiteCode_dev 2022-09-16 14:07 UTC link
No because if it's standard, they will ask you to disable travel mode and download all the data. You can say no, but you can't refuse and cross the border.

It's not a technical problem.

gambiting 2022-09-16 14:10 UTC link
>>So, what is the point in doing this if not to target law abiding citizens.

It's the old rule known to governments all over the world - there is no such thing as an innocent citizen, there is only a citizen who you haven't investigated enough. Call me cynical but storing ALL of your digital data allows the agencies to basically find something, anything, that will allow them to further blackmail you into complying. Even the most innocent person will have something that can be misconstrued as criminal, from jokes about tax evasion to pictures of your toddler in a pool - threaten going to trial if the person doesn't do X, and most people will comply, not because they aren't innocent, but because the might of the American justice system is such that you really don't want to fuck with it on the receiving end.

woodruffw 2022-09-16 14:28 UTC link
> 1. Any malicious person savvy enough to pull off a crime of interest to the Feds is smart enough to provide a wiped or burner phone to DHS/ICE, and they have to know this. So, what is the point in doing this if not to target law abiding citizens.

This isn't even remotely true. See for example the recent Anom honeypot[1]. Criminals do more or less the same things that ordinary citizens do, and often have strictly worse security practices because they believe "ordinary" things are weaker. This makes them great targets for snake oil.

That being said, I agree with (2). It's simply an unnecessary risk to keep this much data around for this long.

[1]: https://www.vice.com/en/article/v7veg8/anom-app-source-code-...

beebeepka 2022-09-16 15:05 UTC link
What do you think would happen to a regular person performing such an act? Would it be like Texas Chainsaw Massacre or a James Bond movie?
shiftpgdn 2022-09-16 15:09 UTC link
I believe there was a defcon talk about this but for the life of me I can't find it. My advice is to epoxy your lightning port closed (or snip the data connection inside the phone) and use wireless charging exclusively.

edit: It was the Signal founder. https://appleinsider.com/articles/21/04/21/signal-hacks-cell...

rootusrootus 2022-09-16 15:45 UTC link
My guess is it would be like setting up a trap gun and putting a sign on the door warning about it. Still illegal. But I'm a rando on the Internet and a loooooong ways from being any kind of lawyer, and I didn't stay in a Holiday Inn Express last night, either.
tablespoon 2022-09-16 15:50 UTC link
> I give them the password to unlock it (otherwise they would seize the phone)

IIRC, I've read they can only hold your phone for 30 days or something like that, then they have to return it to you. They can delay an American citizen, but they can't deny entry.

Ever since then, I travel with a travel phone, make sure my photos are backed up when I cross a border, and shut it down before I go through border control. If they demand a password, I'll put up a little fuss and then let them take it.

sleepdreamy 2022-09-16 15:53 UTC link
If you don't read the 'Accept Me' On most random websites nowadays, most people are just openly giving up access to their devices/data without even knowing it.
pradn 2022-09-16 15:53 UTC link
At the passport control kiosks, they can just scan your face and give you an exit ticket. It was super quick, and surprising. I was able to skip talking to an immigration agent completely. They can do this because they have photos of me from previous kiosk visits, and because they can restrict the universe of photos they need to check to just those who were on recent flights. I wonder how well it works for twins traveling together or something. For any level of uncertainty, they can just have you go talk to a human instead.
Grimburger 2022-09-16 15:54 UTC link
Pretty much all passports have biometrics now. I assume they can work out who you are from that.

In Australia it's an autogate with a face scan for citizens and PR's, you only deal with a person if it can't identify you, which is rare.

pugworthy 2022-09-16 16:29 UTC link
> Borders agents took my phone...

Which countries agents? You were going from US to Canada. Were they Canadian or US agents?

marcosdumay 2022-09-16 16:44 UTC link
Were you on the illusion that they didn't have your biometric data? Or that they didn't have the passenger list with your name in it? Those two are pretty transparent (and honestly, not a big deal).
jdeibele 2022-09-16 17:00 UTC link
One approach would be to upload everything, wipe the phone, then log back in but not connect to iCloud (or Google).

Once you've cleared the border, go to a coffee shop and download over their WiFi. Or not, if you're on a unlimited data plan.

That has the advantage of requiring only one phone but would definitely look like you were hiding something. So your approach of a travel phone is better.

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0.00
Article 8 Right to Remedy
Medium Framing
Structural
0.00
Context Modifier
ND
SETL
+0.50

Not directly relevant.

0.00
Article 9 No Arbitrary Detention
Medium Framing Practice
Structural
0.00
Context Modifier
ND
SETL
+0.65

Not directly relevant.

0.00
Article 11 Presumption of Innocence
High Framing Practice
Structural
0.00
Context Modifier
ND
SETL
+0.75

Not directly relevant.

0.00
Article 18 Freedom of Thought
Low Framing
Structural
0.00
Context Modifier
ND
SETL
+0.40

Not directly relevant.

0.00
Article 19 Freedom of Expression
Medium Framing
Structural
0.00
Context Modifier
ND
SETL
+0.50

Domain publishes news article advocating for privacy rights; neutral on this dimension.

0.00
Article 28 Social & International Order
Medium Framing
Structural
0.00
Context Modifier
ND
SETL
+0.60

Not directly relevant.

0.00
Article 29 Duties to Community
Medium Framing
Structural
0.00
Context Modifier
ND
SETL
+0.55

Not directly relevant.

-0.05
Article 17 Property
Medium Framing Practice
Structural
-0.05
Context Modifier
ND
SETL
+0.62

Domain engages in data collection practices (tracking); minor negative indicator.

-0.10
Article 12 Privacy
High Advocacy Framing Practice Coverage
Structural
-0.10
Context Modifier
ND
SETL
+0.90

Page contains TCF consent framework and ad tracking parameters (xsmr, bid, rid) indicating surveillance-based advertising; domain engages in user data collection.

ND
Article 2 Non-Discrimination

Not addressed.

ND
Article 4 No Slavery

Not addressed.

ND
Article 6 Legal Personhood

Not addressed.

ND
Article 10 Fair Hearing

Not addressed.

ND
Article 13 Freedom of Movement

Not addressed.

ND
Article 14 Asylum

Not addressed.

ND
Article 15 Nationality

Not addressed.

ND
Article 16 Marriage & Family

Not addressed.

ND
Article 20 Assembly & Association

Not addressed.

ND
Article 21 Political Participation

Not addressed.

ND
Article 22 Social Security

Not addressed.

ND
Article 23 Work & Equal Pay

Not addressed.

ND
Article 24 Rest & Leisure

Not addressed.

ND
Article 25 Standard of Living

Not addressed.

ND
Article 26 Education

Not addressed.

ND
Article 27 Cultural Participation

Not addressed.

ND
Article 30 No Destruction of Rights

Not addressed.

Supplementary Signals
How this content communicates, beyond directional lean. Learn more
Epistemic Quality
How well-sourced and evidence-based is this content?
0.78 medium claims
Sources
0.8
Evidence
0.8
Uncertainty
0.7
Purpose
0.9
Propaganda Flags
No manipulative rhetoric detected
0 techniques detected
Emotional Tone
Emotional character: positive/negative, intensity, authority
urgent
Valence
-0.7
Arousal
0.7
Dominance
0.4
Transparency
Does the content identify its author and disclose interests?
0.50
✓ Author
More signals: context, framing & audience
Solution Orientation
Does this content offer solutions or only describe problems?
0.35 mixed
Reader Agency
0.3
Stakeholder Voice
Whose perspectives are represented in this content?
0.40 3 perspectives
Speaks: governmentpolitician
About: individuals
Temporal Framing
Is this content looking backward, at the present, or forward?
present medium term
Geographic Scope
What geographic area does this content cover?
national
United States
Complexity
How accessible is this content to a general audience?
moderate medium jargon general
Longitudinal · 4 evals
+1 0 −1 HN
Audit Trail 24 entries
2026-02-28 12:24 model_divergence Cross-model spread 0.33 exceeds threshold (4 models) - -
2026-02-28 12:24 eval Evaluated by claude-haiku-4-5-20251001: +0.36 (Moderate positive)
2026-02-28 10:46 model_divergence Cross-model spread 0.33 exceeds threshold (3 models) - -
2026-02-28 10:46 eval_success Lite evaluated: Moderate positive (0.56) - -
2026-02-28 10:46 eval Evaluated by llama-4-scout-wai: +0.56 (Moderate positive)
reasoning
Editorial stance on human rights, investigative journalism
2026-02-28 10:46 rater_validation_warn Lite validation warnings for model llama-4-scout-wai: 0W 1R - -
2026-02-28 10:40 eval_success Lite evaluated: Moderate positive (0.50) - -
2026-02-28 10:40 rater_validation_warn Lite validation warnings for model llama-3.3-70b-wai: 0W 1R - -
2026-02-28 10:40 model_divergence Cross-model spread 0.27 exceeds threshold (2 models) - -
2026-02-28 10:40 eval Evaluated by llama-3.3-70b-wai: +0.50 (Moderate positive)
reasoning
Exposing border data seizure
2026-02-26 19:08 eval_success Evaluated: Mild positive (0.23) - -
2026-02-26 19:08 eval Evaluated by deepseek-v3.2: +0.23 (Mild positive) 11,498 tokens
2026-02-26 12:20 dlq Dead-lettered after 1 attempts: US border forces are seizing Americans' phone data and storing it for 15 years - -
2026-02-26 12:18 rate_limit OpenRouter rate limited (429) model=llama-3.3-70b - -
2026-02-26 12:17 rate_limit OpenRouter rate limited (429) model=llama-3.3-70b - -
2026-02-26 12:16 rate_limit OpenRouter rate limited (429) model=llama-3.3-70b - -
2026-02-26 10:13 dlq Dead-lettered after 1 attempts: US border forces are seizing Americans' phone data and storing it for 15 years - -
2026-02-26 10:12 dlq Dead-lettered after 1 attempts: US border forces are seizing Americans' phone data and storing it for 15 years - -
2026-02-26 10:11 dlq Dead-lettered after 1 attempts: US border forces are seizing Americans' phone data and storing it for 15 years - -
2026-02-26 10:11 dlq Dead-lettered after 1 attempts: US border forces are seizing Americans' phone data and storing it for 15 years - -
2026-02-26 10:11 dlq Dead-lettered after 1 attempts: US border forces are seizing Americans' phone data and storing it for 15 years - -
2026-02-26 10:10 dlq Dead-lettered after 1 attempts: US border forces are seizing Americans' phone data and storing it for 15 years - -
2026-02-26 10:10 dlq Dead-lettered after 1 attempts: US border forces are seizing Americans' phone data and storing it for 15 years - -
2026-02-26 10:10 dlq Dead-lettered after 1 attempts: US border forces are seizing Americans' phone data and storing it for 15 years - -